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ABSTRACT 
The survival of peer-to-peer systems depends on the contribution of 
resources by all the participating peers.  Selfish behavior of some peers 
that do not contribute resources inhibits the expected level of service 
delivery. Free riding has been found to seriously affect the performance 
and negates the sharing principle of peer-to-peer networks. In this paper, 
first, we investigate through simulations the effectiveness of a 
proposed linear model for mitigating free riding in a P2P system. 
Second, we extended the initial linear model by incorporating 
additional c o n s t r a i n t s  on download and upload of each peer. 
This helps in reducing the effects of free riding behavior on the 
system. Lastly, we evaluate the impacts of some parameters on 
the models. 
 





Peer-to-peer has become popular as a means of contents sharing 
among vast number of users the world over. The success of P2P 
networks is a result of it obvious advantages over traditional client-
server model which is faced with the challenges of single point of 
failure and expandability.  Despite the successes of P2P systems, 
it also has its challenges. One of such concerns is the problem of 
free riding.  Free riding is a situation in which some peers in a P2P 
sharing system refuse to contribute resources to other while it 
uses others’ resources (Adar et al, 2000; Belmonte et al 2013).  
Several approaches have been proposed in the literature to 
combat free riding, since the survival of P2P systems depends on 
the availability of resources provided by the participating peer.  
In this paper, we propose a global resource optimization model as 
a means to tackle free riding. An extensive simulation is carried 
out to investigate the effectiveness of our approach in minimizing 
free riding. 
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows: In 
section 2, a review of related literature is presented. Section 3 
outlines the proposed model.  The simulation studies are carried 
out in is carried out in section 4, 5, 6 and 7, while section 8 
concludes the paper.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The rising popularity in the use of P2P systems for resource 
sharing also brought some of it challenges to the fore. Free riding, 
as one of the challenges bedeviling P2P network has been 
studied by several researchers e.g (Adar et al., 2000; Belmonte et 
al., 2013, & Azzedin et al., 2014). Currently, efforts are still being 
made to fully understand users’ behaviour and interactions among 
users, so as to design efficient mechanisms to tackle free riding.  
Several approaches have been employed in the literature to solve 
the problem of free riding, but these efforts have not been able 
to eliminate completely free riding in P2P systems. One major 
challenge is the diverse and complex nature of the problem. 
Every solution proffered is usually caught up in the web of 
conflicting requirements. Performance requirements such as ease 
of use, distributed nature, and efficiency are not easy to achieve. 
For example, KaZaa and Emule uses reputation, and contribution 
level to rank peers and assign priority in the request queue 
based on their ranks. But this is not a strong deterrent against 
free riding, a patient free rider might still get services and 
hence, there is feeling of unfairness (Roussopoulous, 2004). Bit 
Torrent uses tit-for-tat to tackle free riding where a peer 
temporarily refuses to upload to a neighbor that refuses to 
upload to it. But this is only specific to Bit Torrent architecture, 
still the problem of unfairness is reported in free riding (Rafit, 2010). 
In general, free riders counteracting approaches can be broadly 
classified into micropayment/credit-based systems, 
trust/reputation based approaches, reciprocity and barter 
based system and game theory/utility based approaches. In 
micropayment based systems users are expected to pay for 
services received and be paid for any services provided to others. 
The idea is to attach economic value to resources in the P2P 
network so as to encourage contribution. This approach utilizes 
virtual currency. It needs centralization, accounting infrastructure, 
pricing and exchange mechanism for effective performance. 
Research work such as Xpay (Chen, et al., 2009 and KARMA 
Vishnumurthy et al., 2003) are based on this approach. Trust and 
reputation approach uses trust information about peer to detect 
free riding behaviour so as to punish unwanted behaviour and 
reward good behaviour. There is a need for trust and transaction 
history information to be able to utilize this approach. The 
problem of white washing, collusion and persistent identity poses 
serious challenge to this method. Examples of trust/       
reputation based approach effort to tackle free riding are (Satsiou 
et al., 2010) and ( T s e n g  e t  a l . ,  2 0 1 1 ) . Reciprocity or 
barter based approaches involves exchanges of services. The 
ability to predict future need from same peer is crucial for this 
mechanism. BitTorrent tit-for-tat (Cohen 2003, Legout et al., 2007) is 
an example of reciprocity based approach. Recently, game 
theory/utility based systems have been explored in the 
understanding of peers’ interactions and counteracting free riding 
in P2P systems. Researchers in (Golle et al., 2001; Gupta et al., 
2005; Hua et al., 2012; Yu et al 2012;  Zhao et al., 2012) used 
game theory in their study of incentives and free riding in P2P 
networks. 
 
THE PROPOSED RESOURCE OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
The detail mathematical analysis of this model can be found in 














































In order to validate our results of the proposed model illustrated on 






In this case, the simulation model is designed as follows; the tracker 
carries out the optimization for each file piece in the system at any 
time. The simulation model run for R1,R2, R3, … Rn;. Where 
R's are the resources (file pieces) and n is the number of f i le 
pieces in the system at a given time. For each resource, an 
optimization table is constructed 
 


































































































In order to validate our preliminary results, the proposed model is 
illustrated on examples and solved using Microsoft Excel Solver. We then 
performed a simulation study and compare the results. The simulation 
model is designed as follows; the tracker carries out the optimization for 
each file piece in the system at any time. The simulation model run for R1, 
R2, R3, . . .,Rn;. Where R's are the resources (file pieces) and n is the 
number of file pieces in the system at a given time. For each resource, an 
optimization table is constructed as shown in Table 1.  
 
SYSTEM INITIALIZATION 
At the start of the simulation, we perform system initialization. This 
involves the network initialization, the tracker initialization and node 
initialization. During network initialization, we set the total numbers of 
peers, the total number of file pieces and average arrival rate of request 
from every peer in the system. In addition, we generate file pieces and 
randomly distribute it to each peer. Initially every peer holds one piece or 
the other, so that every peer has a piece to upload if requested. We 
assumed that at any time, there are pieces that can make up a complete 
file are in the system. 
In node initialization, we categorize every peer in the system into three 
types, Altruist, In-between and Free rider with their probability of serving 
any request sent to them to be 1, 0.5 and 0 respectively. As simulation 
progresses, peers do not change their behaviour, they only interact based 
on their pre-assigned behaviour. The tracker is initialized with all peers’ 
information and it remains active throughout the simulation time. That is, 
we assume the tracker cannot die or go offline during simulations. 
 
EVENT GENERATION 
In each time slot, a request event is generated by a randomly selected 
peer. We model the arrival process of request as a Poisson distribution 
with mean λ. We divided the whole length of the simulation time into slots, 
so as to track interaction in every time slot and compute the statistics. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
We implement our model using PeerSim (Montressor et al., 2009), a P2P 
simulator and BitPeer (Fabrizio et al., 2008) BitTorrent module for 
PeerSim- to evaluate the performance of our proposed method. We 
utilized the tracker in the BitTorrent module to run our algorithm. We 
integrate our simulator with LPsolve (LPsolve 2014) for solving the 
systems of linear equations resulting from the peers’ interactions. The 
results of the LPP when solved is returned to the tracker, it uses the 
results to perform the uploader to downloader assignment so as to 
optimize the entire environment. We used the simulation model depicted 
as flowchart in Figure 1.  
 
PERFORMANCE METRICS 
The objectives of any free riding mitigation mechanism are: (1) To ensure 
cooperation among participating peers (2) To ensure fairness amongst all 
peers in the system and (3) To alleviate the impact inauthentic and 
malicious resources in the system. In this paper, we approach the problem 
of fairness from the whole community point of view. That is, measuring the 
stability of the whole network by optimizing the total utility of the network. 
To determine the stability of the network based on the availability of 
resources, since the existence of P2P sharing is based on the resource 
availability; we propose the total sum of all the peers utility in the system 
as a performance metric. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1: SIMULATING EXAMPLES 
First, we evaluate the proposed model by maximizing the total sum of all 
utilities in the system. To do this, we repeated the same parameters (See 
Table 2), constraints and objective functions used in the proposed 
examples which we solved with Excel solver using our simulator. The 
result is the same as that reported from the Excel Solver from the 
example. In this experiment, we used only one shot model without 
repetition. Hence, we compute the total utility of the system, when every 
peer both uploaders and downloaders utility are taken into consideration 
during maximization. The result here considers the utility maximization and 
stability of the entire system. 
Algorithm: Linear programming formulation: This 
algorithm is run by the tracker. A super peer in the 
network entrusted to manage other peers connected 
to it. 
Procedure  FORMULATELPP 
1. For each file piece pi 
2. While number of downloaders and 
uploaders   
3. The tracker does the following 
4. Collect the uploaders of  i and their utilities 
5. Collect the downloaders of i and their utilities 
6. Formulate LPP with mn  decision variables 
7. Solve LPP 
8. Based on the results of LPP, assign 
downloaders to uploaders 
9.   End while 
10.  End for 
2 
i 
























































































and solves LPP 
solve LPP 
Collect utility 
value of both 
Downloaders 
and Uploaders 
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No. of Uploaders 
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Ratio of peer type 
 
{Altruist = 0:33;  In- betweens = 0:33; F reerider = 0:33} 
 
Prob. of serving by peer type 
 
{Altruist = 1;  In-betweens = 0:5; F reerider = 0 } 
 






EXPERIMENT 2: INVESTIGATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 
PROPOSED LINEAR MODEL TO COUNTERACT FREE RIDING 
To investigate the viability of the proposed linear model in improving 
fairness and discouraging free riders in a P2P system, we perform some 
experiments. In the previous experiment we carried out in section 4.4 the 
performance metric used is the total sum of utilities of all the peers in the 
system at any time t. This value measured the general wellbeing of the 
entire community, but did not give information on the individual 
characteristics of peers. It might be possible that, though the total utility of 
the system is maximized but unfairness may still exist. 
To ascertain the impact of the model on the individual peer behaviour, we 
need to use a different performance metrics. We used the performance 
evaluation criteria proposed in (Hua et al., 2012). The criteria are as follow: 
(1) The number of request fulfilled of free riders: This measure the number 
of successful requests peer get from other peers in the network 
considering the behaviours of that peer. (2) The ratio of upload to 
download of each peer in the system (fairness index): This measure the 
fairness of the whole system to the peers in terms of resource provision 
characteristics. For instance, we do not want few Altruists in the system to 
be overwhelmed by the requests of many free riders in the system. We 
also prefer each peer get resources proportional to its contributions to 
others in the system. The fairness index formula is given as 
                
    
 
    
 
    
  
   
                    (1) 
Where Xi is defined as the ratio of upload to download of every peer. The 
fairness index is bounded by 0 (unfair) and 1 (fair). The larger the value 
the fairer the whole network (Hua et al 2012). The fairness index of 1 does 
not exists in real system due to availability of free riders. Assume there are 
Ns of peers in the networks, Nf of Free riders, Ni of In-between, and Na of 
Altruists with ratios Pf; Pi and Pa respectively. 
 
 














Ratio of peer type 
 
{Altruist = 0:33; In- betweens = 0:33; F reerider = 0:33} 
 
Prob. of serving by peer type 
 
{Altruist = 1; In      betweens = 0:5; F reerider = 0} 
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The value Xi for free riders is 0, hence, the maximum fairness index will be 
a constant Q and it is bounded by the ratio of free riders. This can be 
derived as follows: 
 
               
                  
 
         
           
  
  
                             (2) 
 
Now, to evaluate using the new set of performance metrics, we repeat the 
experiments in section 6 with the same simulation model for 10 time slots. 
In each time slot, we measure the total upload and download of each peer. 
We generate a random utility values between 0 and 10 and distribute it 
amongst the peers. These utility values are used in the formulation of the 
LPP model. The parameters and their values are as shown in Table 3.The 
results of the Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) model as shown 
in Figure 2 and Figure 3 focus on the download and upload amount of 
each peer in a time period. It reveals that the proposed model in it pure 
form does not prevent free riders from downloading a significant amount of 
file from others without contributing to others. It is shown in Figure 3 that 
free riders get on the average total upload of 25 units of resources which is 
slightly lesser than that of 30 units of In-between and 34 units of Altruists. 
Comparing their downloads to the corresponding upload of 0, 32 and 56 
units for Free riders, In-between and Altruist respectively. We conclude 
that though, the MILP model maximized the total utility of the system, the 





























 Figure 3: Average total uploads and downloads per peer Vs Peer type 
EXTENDED LINEAR MODEL To reduce the unfairness we observed in our previous model, we extended 
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the linear model by adding additional constraint to the model. We made 
the payoff a ratio of upload to download.          The ratio is a threshold µ 
which is obtained as follows; 
  
    
    
 
where    is the total upload of peer i and   is the total download of peer 
i. We added 1, to remove the possibility of division by zero, when no 
download is made by the peer. To test the effect of this additional 
constraint, we describe the experiment we performed in the following 
section. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3: EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF 
ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINT 
We repeat the same experiment with the same model but with the new 
constraint added. We set the value of µ = 0.8 initially and run the 
simulation for 10 time slots. The results as depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 
5 show that there is a significant reduction on the total downloads free 
riders can do within this period. In this case, free riders got an average of 3 
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EXPERIMENT 4: THE EFFECT OF SIMULATION TIME 
ON MODEL 
To determine the impact of time on the model, we extended the simulation 
time from 10 to 100. The results as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 8 
indicate that there is no significant increase in the download amount of 
Free riders, compare to the upload and download of non-free riders. 
Though, we observe that there are differences between the upload and 
download amount of non-free riders as time progresses, this does not 
affect overall fairness of the system. Hence, we conclude that the 
extended linear model is promising in our quest to effectively mitigate free 
riding in P2P systems. Since, it succeeded in avoiding a P2P system made 
up of island of few providers and many free riding consumers which may 
leads to the collapse of the entire system if the few resource providers 
leave the network. The model achieves a vital goal of any free riding 
mitigation techniques of improving fairness and ensuring resource 
availability. Since, the results show that those free riding peers that do not 
contribute file pieces to others are isolated from the network within the 
shortest possible time of interactions with others. 
 





No. of peers 
 
100 




Ratio of peer type 
 
{Altruist = 0:33;  In-betweens = 0:33; F reerider = 0:33} 
 
Prob. of serving by peer type 
 
{Altruist = 1;  In- betweens = 0:5; F reerider = 0} 
 

























































































 Figure 8: Average Total service provided and received per peer Vs Peer type 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 5: EVALUATING THE EFFCTS OF 
PARAMETERS 
To determine the most suitable value of µ = 0:8 that we used in the model, 
we investigate the impact of different values of µ on the model. First, we 
study the impact of µ on the fairness index. The results as presented in 
Figure 9 shows that, the fairness of the system is stable after a short time 
period of around 18 time slots. Initially, the fairness index is undefined 
between 1 and 4 time slot represented as 0 in the figure, this is due to cold 
start where majority of the peers interacting have not downloaded any 
piece at that time. Second, we evaluate the effects of the threshold µ on 
the download of Free riders. The results as shown in Figure 10 and Figure 
11 indicate that the threshold has a significant impact on the model, as µ = 
0:2, a free rider gets on the average of 152 downloads compared to 32 
when the value of µ is set to 0.8. It is also observed through the 
experimentation, that the value of µ between 0.6 and 1 is a reasonable 






































































In this paper, first, we propose an analytical framework for incentive in P2P 
systems. Second we investigate through simulations the effectiveness of 
the proposed linear model for mitigating free riding in a P2P system. The 
results from the simulation of the example validate the correctness of the 
results from the Microsoft Excel Solver. Third, we extended the initial linear 
model by incorporating additional constraint on download and upload of 
each peer. This helps in reducing the effects of free riding behaviour on 
the system. Lastly, we evaluate the impacts of some parameters on the 
model. 
Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that we only considered free riding type 
in which a free rider does not contribute resources to other peers in the 
system. We do not consider trust and reputation behaviour of the peers in 
our model. As future work, if this is incorporated it can improve the 
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